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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 2, 1986, Judge Richard Posner of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit announced to an
astonished legal profession, not to mention the unsuspecting attor-
neys-of-record, that, in the future, the Seventh Circuit would
decide whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction by apply-
ing the following simple formula:
P xHp > (1-P) x Hd1
With one fell swoop of his algebraic-judicial pen, Judge Posner not
only stirred the deepest math anxieties of the practicing bar, but
revolutionized preliminary injunction law. Despite Judge Posner's
protestations that his simple formula was not "offered as a new
legal standard,"2 preliminary injunction law will never be the same.
This Article addresses the transcendental question raised by
this preliminary injunction formula: What hath Judge Posner
wrought? On sober reflection, it is abundantly clear that Judge
Posner's preliminary injunction formula sprang full-blown from
the head of an academic-economist turned judge. The preliminary
injunction formula is a logical extension of Judge Posner's desire to
impose econometrics on all aspects of the law.3 Dissatisfied with
the untidiness of mere mortal judicial decisionmaking, Judge Pos-
ner intends to rationalize the law by Benthamizing it-by subject-
ing the law to a twentieth century version of felicific calculus."
This Article sounds the alarm concerning Judge Posner's
seemingly innocent mathematical foray into preliminary injunction
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of
America. This Article was prepared with the support of a summer research grant from the
Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America.
1. American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.
1985).
2. Id.
3. See infra Parts III(D) & IV(A). "Econometrics," as it is used here, means the
"[blranch of economics concerned with application of mathematical economics by use of
statistics." THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 328 (6th ed. 1976).
4. "Felicific calculus" is the term most often applied to Jeremy Bentham's "moral
arithmetic" based on the fundamental principle of happiness maximization. For a descrip-
tion of Bentham's elaborate rules for this moral arithmetic and its relation to the law,,see E.
HALvY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADIcALIsM 29-33 (M. Morris trans. 1955).
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law. Judge Posner's formula should not be viewed simply as an
"intellectually diverting" exercise, 5 but should be recognized for
what it truly is: the camel's head in the tent. Judge Posner long
has been an advocate of market analysis in appropriate substantive
legal contexts such as antitrust, tort, corporation, securities, and
tax law.' With his preliminary injunction formula, however, he has
crossed the great divide between market and nonmarket applica-
tions of econometrics.7 If Professor Posner has his druthers as a
judge, he will reduce all of civil procedure to a neat set of
formulas."
This Article argues that Judge Posner's efforts to Benthamize
civil procedure are an abomination in theory and practice. Judge
Posner's preliminary injunction formula should be "bur[ied] with
kindness,"9 and any further attempts to quantify civil procedure
should be resisted swiftly and sternly. Econometrics should be rel-
egated to limited substantive applications and not engrafted onto
inappropriate procedural motions.
Part II of this Article outlines the short happy life of formula
Posner. 10 This section first discusses Judge Posner's articulation of
the preliminary injunction formula in American Hospital Supply
Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd.1" and then describes the formula's
reception in the Seventh Circuit and among the district courts. Far
from being repudiated outright, Judge Posner's formula has taken
shallow root at the trial court level. Significantly, however, trial
judges have manifested groping uncertainties in utilizing the new-
5. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1346 (7th Cir.
1986) (Will, J., concurring).
6. See, e.g., Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust Investment Law (pts. I &
II), 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1; 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corpora-
tions, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976); Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation,
83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCL
22 (1971). The arguments of many of these pieces are summarized in various chapters in R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
or LAW].
7. See infra Parts III(D) & IV(A); see also R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 1-6
(1981) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE].
8. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, at 429-57. Much of this argu-
ment is derived from Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Ad-
ministration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973) [hereinafter Posner, Legal Procedure and Judi-
cial Administration].
9. Ball Memorial Hosp., 784 F.2d at 1347 (Will, J., concurring).
10. With apologies to E. HEMINGWAY, The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber, in
THE SHORT STORIES OF ERNEST HEMINGWAY 3 (Scribners 1966).
11. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1985).
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fangled formula. Consequently, recent Seventh Circuit decisions
amply demonstrate the many problems inherent in quantifying the
preliminary injunction process.
Part III explores the roots of Judge Posner's preliminary
injunction formula and illustrates that the formula is a logical ex-
tension of Judge Posner's lifelong commitment to rationalizing le-
gal substance and procedure. This section demonstrates that Judge
Posner is an intellectual heir of Jeremy Bentham, who attempted
to develop a felicific calculus of the law,12 and Judge Learned
Hand, who attempted to develop algebraic torts.13 More recently,
Professor John Leubsdorf has provided Judge Posner with an eco-
nomic analysis of preliminary injunctions, stressing minimization
of error through probabilistic calculations. 4 This section further
demonstrates that these intellectual strands have merged in Pro-
fessor Posner's writing and Judge Posner's decisions.' 5 More
importantly, however, this section exposes the problems associated
with applying econometric methodology to civil procedure, includ-
ing the methodology's reliance on unsound premises, uncertain
probabilistic assessments, implicit subjectivity, and illusory
objectivity.
Part IV demonstrates that Judge Posner's preliminary injunc-
tion formula is not an isolated decisional novelty. Instead, the
formula represents an initial foray into mathematical civil proce-
dure. Unless the formulaic approach is reproved swiftly, the legal
profession can expect Judge Posner to announce additional proce-
dural formulas. Judge Posner's efforts to Benthamize civil proce-
dure should be rejected because they undermine principled
decisionmaking.
This Article is not merely about preliminary injunctions."6 Nor
is it a roaming discussion of the ever-burgeoning field of law and
economics.' 7 Rather, it is an article that rejects and warns of the
12. See supra note 4.
13. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); see also infra
Part III(B).
14. See Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525
(1978); see also infra Part III(C).
15. See infra Part III(D).
16. For recent discussion and analysis of preliminary injunction law, see generally
Black, A New Look At Preliminary Injunctions: Can Principles From The Past Offer Any
Guidelines To Decisionmakers in the Future?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1984); Hammond, Inter-
locutory Injunctions: Time For A New Model?, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 240 (1980).
17. For a broad survey of recent literature in law-and-economics theory, see POSNER,
ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, at xvii-xxiii & 4-23; POSNER, EcoNoMIcs OF JUS-
TICE, supra note 7, at 1-9; West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in
[Vol. 40:541
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incipient Benthamization of civil procedure. In the final analysis,
this Article is an attempt to supply reasoned argument to one dis-
trict judge's plaintive response to Judge Posner's preliminary
injunction formula: "[I]f it ain't broke, don't fix it."'18
II. THE SHORT HAPPY LIFE OF FORMULA POSNER
A. American Hospital Supply and the Formula for Preliminary
Injunctions
Judge Posner first announced his preliminary injunction
formula in American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products
Ltd. 9 The concepts embodied in the formula, however, can be
found in Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.2 0 and
other earlier Posner decisions .2 In American Hospital Supply, an
otherwise ordinary appeal, Judge Posner upheld a preliminary
injunction that prevented a supplier from terminating a contract
with a distributor of surgical stapling systems.2 2 While paying lip-
service to the standard four-factor test courts commonly utilize in
deciding whether to grant or deny preliminary injunctions, Judge
Posner deftly shifted analysis away from traditional equitable con-
cerns and refocused on a more scientific inquiry-the minimization
the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 483,
483-85, nn.1-4 (1985).
18. Ball Memorial Hasp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1347 (7th Cir.
1986) (Will, J. concurring).
19. 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986).
20. 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984). In Roland Machinery, Judge Posner gave the fullest
verbal exposition of the error-minimizing theory of preliminary injunctions, without the
mathematical expression that would follow in American Hospital Supply:
[T]he task for the district judge in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for
preliminary injunction is to minimize errors: the error of denying an injunction to one
who will in fact (though no one can know this for sure) go on to win the case on the
merits, and the error of granting an injunction to one who will go on to lose. The judge
must try to avoid the error that is more costly in the circumstances. That cost is a
function of the gravity of the error if it occurs and the probability that it will occur.
The error of denying an injunction to someone whose legal rights have in fact been
infringed is thus more costly the greater the magnitude of the harm that the plaintiff
will incur from the denial and the greater the probability that his legal rights really
have been infringed. And similarly the error of granting an injunction to someone
whose legal rights will turn out not to have been infringed is more costly the greater
the magnitude of the harm to the defendant from the injunction and the smaller the
likelihood that the plaintiff's rights really have been infringed.
Id. at 388.
21. See, e.g., Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., with
Cudahy & Pell, J.J.); Maxim's Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1985) (Cudahy, J.,
with Coffey & Peck, J.J.) (relying on Roland Machinery, 749 F.2d 380).
22. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 592-93, 598-600.
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of error.23
Judge Posner's economic view of preliminary injunctions is
tidy and internally logical. Preliminary injunctions, by their
nature, are granted or denied often on incomplete, inadequate
records in hasty proceedings. The proceedings are fraught with
opportunities for error, and decisional mistakes can prove costly to
the losing litigant. The function of the judge in the preliminary
injunction context, therefore, is to minimize error-" [t] o choose
the course of action that will minimize the costs of being mis-
taken." '24 The judge's analysis, therefore, must focus on the relative
costs of a mistaken injunction to either the plaintiff or the defend-
ant. If a judge erroneously grants a preliminary injunction to a
plaintiff who is not entitled to such relief, "the judge commits a
mistake whose gravity is measured by the irreparable harm, if any,
that the injunction causes to the defendant while it is in effect."25
If, on the other hand, a judge erroneously denies a preliminary
injunction to a deserving plaintiff, "the judge commits a mistake
whose gravity is measured by the irreparable harm, if any, that the
denial of the preliminary injunction does to the plaintiff."2
Once the costs of these mistakes are defined, the probability
that these mistakes will be made can be compared and the less
"costly" option selected by means of a simple formula:
[A judge should] grant the preliminary injunction if but only if P x H u >
(1-P) x Hd or, in words, only if the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is
denied, multiplied by the probability that the denial would be an error (that
23. Id. at 593-94. Judge Posner conceptualized the "familiar four (sometimes five) fac-
tor test" as follows:
[1] whether the plaintiff will be irreparably harmed if the preliminary injunction is
denied, [2] ... whether the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, [3] whether the
harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is denied will exceed the harm to the
defendant if it is granted, [4] whether the plaintiff is reasonably likely to prevail at
trial, and [5] whether the public interest will be affected by granting or denying the
injunction.
Id. In Roland Machinery Judge Posner suggested a possible sixth factor: whether the pre-
liminary injunction will preserve the status quo. 749 F.2d at 383. For a discussion of these
factors and the standards for preliminary injunction review, see generally 0. FIss, INJUNC-
TIONS (1972); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 2941-
2950 (1973).
The author does not dispute that the standards for preliminary injunction are in disar-
ray among the circuits and suffer from vague, ambiguous formulations. The best recent cri-
tique of current standards is supplied in Leubsdorf, supra note 14, at 525. Notwithstanding
the multitude of problems attending preliminary injunction determinations, Judge Posner's
approach has not improved the law, but worsened it. See infra Part IV(B).
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the plaintiff, in other words, will win at trial), exceeds the harm to the
defendant if the injunction is granted, multiplied by the probability that
granting the injunction would be an error. That probability is simply one mi-
nus the probability that the plaintiff will win at trial; for if the plaintiff has,
say, a 40 percent chance of winning, the defendant must have a 60 percent
chance of winning (1.00 - .40 = .60). The left-hand side of the formula is
simply the probability of an erroneous denial weighted by the cost of denial
to the plaintiff, and the right-hand side simply the probability of an errone-
ous grant weighted by the cost of grant to the defendant."
Anticipating professional resistance to this formulation, Judge
Posner carefully accompanied his succinct mathematical exposition
with numerous apologias. The formula, Judge Posner professed,
was not a new legal standard,28 but merely a distillation of existing
preliminary injunction factors: 9 "The analysis it capsulizes is stan-
dard. '30 The formula was not intended "to force analysis into a
quantitative strait jacket,"31 but to assist judges in the assessment
of elements and to aid judges in determining the error-minimizing
course of action. 2 Moreover, Judge Posner pointed out, algebraic
expression of legal concepts was not novel, as evidenced by Judge
Learned Hand's "famous negligence formula."3 "
Judge Posner's caveats, however, are disingenuous. In actual-
ity, Judge Posner's formula is a new legal standard, and it does not
merely encapsulate the existing preliminary injunction test. The
formula is a bold rewriting of preliminary injunction law. Judge
Posner's formula represents an effort to sever the preliminary
injunction determination from its equitable roots, thereby standing
the injunction proceeding on its head.3 4 It is inaccurate to suggest
27. Id.
28. Id. But see id. at 602 (Swygert, J., dissenting) ("The court today continues what it
began in Roland Machinery v. Dresser Industries ... : a wholesale revision of the law of
preliminary injunctions.").
29. See id. at 593-94; see also supra note 23.
30. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 594.
31. Id. at 593.
32. Id.
33. Id., citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., decision). For a discussion of Judge Learned Hand's "famous
negligence formula," see infra Part III(B).
34. Judge Posner's strong antipathy to the equitable discretion permitted judges in
the preliminary injunction context is vented graphically in Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d
859 (7th Cir. 1985). In Shondel, Judge Posner utilized this preliminary injunction case as a
bully pupit to rage against the "free-wheeling ethical discretion" inherent in equity
proceedings:
The maxim that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands,".., captures
very nicely the moralistic, rule-less, natural-law character of the equity jurisprudence
created by the Lord Chancellors of England when the office was filled by clerics ....
1987]
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that the formula does not force analysis into a quantitative strait
jacket. Without quantification, strait-jacketed or not, the formula
is meaningless and useless. By its very nature, the formula compels
quantification of an unquantifiable process. Finally, Judge Posner's
attempt to associate his formula with Learned Hand's "famous
negligence formula" is more judicial finesse than judicial
fact-Learned Hand's negligence formula hardly is famous and is
promoted scantily, except by Judge Posner 5 The point, however,
is not to cavil about Judge Posner's own characterizations of his
decision, but to demonstrate the poverty of Judge Posner's meth-
odology on its merits.36
Judge Swygert, dissenting in both Roland Machinery and
American Hospital Supply, attacked Judge Posner's decision on
two broad grounds: (1) it constituted a "wholesale revision of the
law of preliminary injunctions," and (2) it "transgress [ed] the lim-
its of... appellate authority. 3 7 Judge Swygert viewed Judge Pos-
ner's attempt to quantify the injunction process as "antithetical to
the underlying principles of injunctive relief.38 Because equity, by
its nature, was founded in ideas of flexibility and discretion, Judge
Posner's formula eliminated that traditional mitigating element of
equity jurisdiction. The exisiting four-part standard for prelimi-
nary injunctions represented "the historical balance struck by the
courts between the rigidity of law and the flexibility of equity.
'39
[Tihe proposition that equitable relief is "discretionary" cannot be maintained today
without careful qualification. A modern judge, English or American, state or federal,
bears very little resemblance to a Becket or a Wolsey or a More, but instead adminis-
ters a system of rules which bind him whether they have their origin in law or in equity
and whether they are enforced by damages or by injunctions.
Id. at 867-68 (citations omitted).
35. See, e.g., Davis v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1264 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J., decision); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.,
decision); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d
1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., decision); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d
951, 958 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J. decision). For a discussion of Judge Posner's populariza-
tion of Judge Learned Hand's formula, see infra Part Ill(B).
36. Professor Posner charges that his critics attack all of social science methodology
rather than critically evaluating positive economic analysis on its merits. See Posner, Some
Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CH. L. REv. 281, 288 (1979) [hereinafter Pos-
ner, Some Uses and Abuses].
37. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 602 (Swygert, J., dissenting). See also Roland
Mach., 749 F.2d at 396-404 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
38. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 609 (Swygert, J., dissenting). Judge Swygert's
point is that the "precision" demanded by the majority's preliminary injunction formula is
antithetical to the necessarily flexible, imprecise nature of equitable decisionmaking.
39. Id. Judge Swygert rejected Judge Posner's attempt to create an equitable analog
with Learned Hand's negligence formula. Judge Swygert stated:
548 [Vol. 40:541
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The essential role of the judge in the preliminary injunction pro-
cess, therefore, was to "rely on [his] own judgment, not on mathe-
matical quanta. 4 0 To Judge Swygert, the prospect of litigating
attorneys "dust[ing] off their calculators and dress[ing] their argu-
ments in quantitative clothing" ' was rueful: "The resulting spec-
tacle will perhaps be entertaining, but I do not envy the district
courts of this circuit and I am not proud of the task we have given
them. '42 Judge Swygert further objected to Judge Posner's disre-
gard for the district court's findings. By substituting a "series of
imagined harms that might have, but did not, furnish the basis for
the grant of the preliminary injunction '43. for the district court's
findings, Judge Posner transgressed the limits of appellate review
and effectively reviewed the district court's decision de novo."
Judge Swygert's criticisms are well founded and form a solid
basis for critiquing Judge Posner's efforts to quantify legal pro-
ceedings. Formulas invite abuse of the appellate process by
allowing, if not requiring, one set of judges to second-guess an-
other's hypothesized calculations of harm or probabilities of suc-
cess. Because the preliminary injunction formula is precise, the
values assigned to imagined harms or hypothesized probabilities
Proceedings in equity and cases sounding in tort demand entirely different responses of
a district judge. The judgment of the district judge in a tort case must be definite; the
judgment of the district judge in an injunction proceeding cannot, by its very nature,
be as definite. The judgment of a district judge in an injunction proceeding must be
flexible and discretionary-within the bounds of the now settled four-prong test.
Id.
40. Id. Again, reiterating the distinction between equitable determinations and Judge
Posner's formula, Judge Swygert emphasized: "Equity, as the majority concedes, involves
the assessment of factors that cannot be quantified. A district court faced with the task of
deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction must to some extent, the majority con-
cedes, rely on the 'feel'of the case." Id.
41. Id. at 610.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 604.
44. Id. at 602-10. In addition to transgressing well-established limits of appellate re-
view, Judge Swygert noted that the majority ironically never attempted to quantify any of
the variables in Judge Posner's formula:
We are never told how to measure P or H or Hd. I believe, and the majority appears
to concede, that a numerical value could never be assigned to these variables. Who can
say, for instance, what exactly the probability is that granting of the injunction was an
error? How then will the majority's formula ease in a meaningful way the responsibili-
ties of the district courts?
Id. at 609 (emphasis in original). Judge Swygert questioned the wisdom of adopting a math-
ematical formula as the law governing preliminary injunctions and disputed that the
formula was "merely a distillation of the traditional four-prong test. But if nothing is added
to the substantive law," he queried, "why bother?" Id.
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are outcome determinative. 45 Paradoxically, the precision the
formula demands is antithetical to the injunctive process and sub-
versive of equity jurisdiction. One of equity's threshold require-
ments is that the party invoking that jurisdiction have no adequate
remedy at law.46 In preliminary injunction proceedings, this re-
quirement traditionally has meant that monetary damages cannot
compensate the plaintiff's injury4' and that the harm the plaintiff
will suffer in the absence of an injunction is irreparable-that is,
not reparable by monetary damages after trial.48 Ironically, Judge
Posner's formula requires counsel and judges to do precisely the
opposite of what equity demands-quantify the litigant's injuries
and harms. Injury, harm, and probability of success each must be
assigned a value in order for Judge Posner's formula to make
sense. Yet, if these factors can be quantified at the preliminary in-
junction stage, an adequate remedy at law exists, and the court's
equity jurisdiction should not be invoked.
Judge Swygert's insight is perceptive because Judge Posner's
formula replaces vague, discretionary, equitable assessments with
quantifiable verities. Ultimately, Judge Posner's quarrel is not
with the imprecision of preliminary injunction proceedings, but
with equity jurisdiction altogether.50 In Judge Posner's ideal judi-
cial universe, mathematical precision would dominate legal deci-
sionmaking, and equity, an untidy anachronism, would be rele-
gated to the dustbin of legal history as a quaint relic of Anglo-
American jurisprudence.
B. Reception on the Seventh Circuit of Formula Posner
Judge Posner's preliminary injunction formula has received
mixed reviews on the Seventh Circuit, giving rise to some confu-
sion concerning the formula's status as governing precedent.51
45. See infra Part HI(C) (discussion of Professor Leubsdorf's preliminary injunction
model).
46. See generally 0. Fiss, supra note 23; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 23,
§ 2944.
47. See generally 0. Fiss, supra note 23; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 23,
§§ 2944, 2948.
48. See generally 0. Fiss, supra note 23; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER. supra note 23,
§§ 2944, 2948.
49. The formula simply does not make a great deal of sense unless the variables are
quantified-as demonstrated by the cases subsequent to American Hospital Supply. See
infra Parts II(B) & (C).
50. See supra note 34; see also Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 383-84, 389-90.
51. There have been three Seventh Circuit opinions subsequently discussing Judge
Posner's preliminary injunction formula as set out in America Hospital Supply: Ball Memo-
[Vol. 40:541
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Although some judges have voiced guarded skepticism, most have
accepted the formula as a mathematical shorthand for determining
whether or not to grant preliminary injunctions. The decisions,
however, illustrate the problems inherent in applying the formula,
as well as in integrating it with traditional injunction standards.
In Lawson Products, Inc. v. Avnet, Inc.,52 the first decision
following American Hospital Supply, the Seventh Circuit
"remove[d] any possible confusion" concerning the status of pre-
liminary injunction law by stating that the principles of Roland
Machinery and American Hospital Supply were "in harmony with
the traditionally flexible and discretionary responsibilities of the
district judge. '5 3 Judge Posner's preliminary injunction formula,
therefore, comes into play only after a plaintiff has satisfied the
traditional threshold requirements for equitable relief-no ade-
quate remedy at law, danger of irreparable harm, and likelihood of
success on the merits.5 4 The Seventh Circuit held that the formula
was not intended to establish a rigid approach to deciding the in-
junction issue, but rather to supply an "effective shorthand
method of expressing the important relationship between the like-
lihood of success on the merits and the degree of harm to the non-
prevailing party.
'55
Notwithstanding this endorsement, the court recognized the
significant problems inherent in applying the new formula. First,
the court noted that the formula could "create a false impression
that the elements of the formula, the magnitudes and probabilities,
can be accurately quantified and that through a specified type of
mental calculus the singularly 'correct' result can be arrived at
rial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., for
the majority); Brunswick Corp. v. Jones, 784 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1986) (Eschbach, J., for the
majority); Lawson Prods., Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 782 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1986) (Flaum, J., for
the majority). Although these decisions discuss and affirm Judge Posner's approach, the
tenor of the opinions is ambiguous, at best. This is suggested by the concluding paragraph
in Lawson:
In conclusion, it is important to reemphaize the scope and nature of the preliminary
injunction remedy in this circuit. Roland and American Hospital provide important
insights which may be helpful in the exercise of a district judge's discretion. Neverthe-
less, these decisions, as well as this opinion, represent a continued affirmation of the
traditional equitable factors governing injunctions and the classic roles of both district
and appellate courts.
782 F.2d at 1441. The status of Judge Posner's injunction formula was undermined further
by Judge Will's concurring opinion in Ball Memorial Hospital, 784 F.2d at 1346-47.
52. 782 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1986).
53. Id. at 1432.
54. Id. at 1433.
55. Id. at 1434.
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with some exactitude. ' 5 s Such quantification was at any rate mis-
leading, the court noted, because the elements of the preliminary
injunction formula could be quantified only by mediating subjec-
tive value judgments.
57
Second, the court recognized that the formula implies that a
single, "correct" result is achievable. Equity, on the other hand,
requires a "just" or "fair" result, rather than a mathematically cor-
rect one.58 Although a court's inability to measure damages often is
the reason for seeking an injunction, the formula requires such a
measurement.59 To the extent that the formula engrafts legalistic
formalism onto a traditional equitable remedy, the court noted, it
changes the law:
[I]t is impossible to think in terms of a single correct result. In each case
there exist a number of fair accommodations. If a rigid formulaic approach is
used, where the motion is granted only if X > Y or so many stated criteria
are met, one of the central questions, what kind or degree of relief is appro-
priate, is not answered. As the type of relief varies the parameters of the
injunction equation will also change, making it very difficult to achieve the
accurate, cost-minimizing result. Implicit in equity's connection to the vague
concept of fairness is a need for flexibility. 0
Finally, while the court reiterated that Roland Machinery and
American Hospital Supply remained the law of the circuit, it
issued the coup de grace to Posner's formulaic approach by con-
cluding that preliminary injunction decisions ultimately were intu-
itive and incapable of quantification. The court stated:
The ultimate decision of whether or not to grant the motion is in a real sense
intuitive. The law of injunctions tells the judge what factors are relevant
but . . . the balancing and weighing process is not susceptible to quantifica-
tion or formalization. Ultimately, the district judge has to arrive at a decision
based on a subjective evaluation of the import of the various factors and a
personal, intuitive sense about the nature of the case."1
56. Id. For a generalized discussion of the problem of "illusory objectivity," see infra
Part III(C)(2)(d).
57. Id. For a generalized discussion of the problem of "implicit subjectivity," see infra
Part II(C)(2)(c). The Lawson court noted:
The obvious problem with this is that the impression is false: a figure representing the
probability of success can be arrived at only through a subjective estimate by the court
and the magnitudes of harm are rarely susceptible to quantification because of the
subjective values, externalities, and effects on the public interest that may be involved
in an injunction case.
782 F.2d at 1434. For a generalized discussion of the problem of "implicit subjectivity," see
infra Part III(C)(2)(c).
58. 782 F.2d at 1435.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1436. the court repeatedly expressed its ambivalence concerning the utility
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Rather than repudiate Judge Posner's formula outright, the
Lawson majority reaffirmed the formula's utility while offering
compelling reasons for its rejection. By reaffirming Posner's for-
mulaic approach, the Lawson court endorsed a binding precedent
of dubious and questionable validity. It is not surprising, then,
that two subsequent Seventh Circuit opinions6 2 represent the
denouement of formula Posner. This denouement is most evident
in Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance,
Inc." In Ball the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court's deci-
sion to deny a preliminary injunction, which had been based on
traditional preliminary injunction analysis. In a concurring opin-
ion, Judge Will noted that the quality of justice would not have
been improved had the district judge applied Judge Posner's
formula.6 4 Viewing Lawson and Ball Memorial Hospital together,
Judge Will concluded that the Seventh Circuit has attempted to
"'bury with kindness' the legal revisionism undertaken in Roland
and American Hospital.""5 Heartily concurring in this effort,
Judge Will stated: "There is an old and wise saying: 'if it ain't
broke, don't fix it.' As evidenced by [the district judge's] decision
and opinion, the traditional standards 'ain't broke.' "66
C. Reception in the District Courts of Formula Posner
It is unnecessary to dwell at length on the district courts' reac-
tion to Judge Posner's formula except to note that they have
accepted the formula as the legal standard for preliminary injunc-
tive relief and have had difficulty applying it. The district courts
apparently disagree concerning exactly what the formula embodies
of Judge Posner's mathematical approach: "We are convinced that the system, despite its
real and semantic shortcomings ... has acceptably performed its function over the years
and is not in need of a drastic overhaul." Id. at 1434.
62. Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986);
Brunswick Corp. v. Jones, 784 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1986).
63. 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986). The single most interesting aspect of the Ball Me-
morial Hospital opinion is that it is authored by Circuit Judge Easterbrook, Judge Posner's
former junior faculty colleague at the University of Chicago Law School, and co-author of an
antitrust casebook. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUS. CASES, EcONoMIc NOTES
AND OTHER MATERIALS (2d ed. 1981); see also Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority:
A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REv. 622 (1985) (response to Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal
Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HAv. L. REv. 592 (1985)). The Ball Memorial Hospital
opinion can be viewed as a less than stirring endorsement of formula Posner by a fellow
colleague and like-minded law-and-economics devotee.





and what to do with the "public interest" element of traditional
preliminary injunction analysis. More significantly, the courts have
conceded that while the formula requires quantification, the best
that can be mustered in real situations are rough estimations of
harms and probabilities. In short, while accepting Judge Posner's
formula and reiterating its significance, the lower courts are doing
exactly what they always have done in injunction proceed-
ings-exercising equitable discretion in order to achieve rough
justice.
MidCon Corp. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.0 illustrates these
trends. In MidCon the plaintiff, a pipeline corporation that was
the target of a tender offer, sought a preliminary injunction to
enjoin its acquisition by the defendant. 8 The court noted that the
Seventh Circuit had reduced the four traditional preliminary
injunction factors to an algebraic formula and that both the plain-
tiff and the defendant could be irreparably harmed by an errone-
ous injunction decision. 9 The court further recognized that the
traditional public interest element of preliminary injunction analy-
sis could support either the plaintiff or the defendant, but that in
the present case the public's interest was negligible because it was
difficult to discern how the public would be affected by a change in
the corporation's ownership.70 Because the plaintiff and defendant
would suffer roughly the same injuries from an erroneously granted
injunction, the solution to Judge Posner's equation depended on
the plaintiff's ability to show "a better than 50 percent chance of
winning the case."''1 Characterizing the plaintiff's chance as a long
shot, 2 the court denied injunctive relief.
MidCon is striking in many respects. First, the court neglected
to analyze the traditional threshold elements necessary for a pre-
liminary injunction and simply considered the traditional factors
incorporated in Judge Posner's formula.7 3 By so doing, the court
67. 625 F. Supp. 1475 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
68. Id. at 1476-79.
69. Id. at 1479. The court stated: "In American Hospital Supply Corporation v. Hos-
pital Products Limited .... Judge Posner reduced these factors to an algebraic formula
70. Id. at 1482. The court noted: "At first blush, Judge Posner's formula seems to
ignore the public interest. The public interest, however, may be factored with the injury on
either side of the equation, depending on where the public interest lies." Id.
71. Id. at 1480.
72. Id. ("The court is hesitant to handicap a judicial contest and apply percentages to
the likelihood of success on the merits; however, in this case plaintiff's chances of success
can only be characterized as a long shot.").
73. Id. at 1479.
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acted contrarily to even Seventh Circuit decisions. Second, the
court made no effort to calculate the plaintiff's injury, but merely
indicated that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if the
proposed merger violated antitrust law and was not enjoined. 4
Third, the court threw up its figurative hands in trying to assess
the harm that the defendant would suffer if an injunction were
granted erroneously.7 5 Having conceded the impossibility of its
task, the court concluded that blocking an otherwise lawful tender
offer would constitute irreparable injury as a matter of law.76 Fi-
nally, the court made scant effort to quantify the probability that
the plaintiff would win at trial, pointing out that "[t]he court is
hesitant to handicap a judicial contest and apply percentages to
the likelihood of success on the merits. 77 Nonetheless, because the
formula forced the court to quantify this probability, the court
boldly calculated the probability "as a long shot."78 Plugging these
values into the equation, the court concluded that Judge Posner's
formula mandated that it deny the plaintiff's request for a prelimi-
nary injunction."
The MidCon case is a parody of the Posner formula. Although
the court set forth the preliminary injunction equation as a legal
standard, the court quantified absolutely nothing because it was
unable to. Ironically, because the litigants were not required to sat-
isfy traditional threshold equity requirements, they were faced
with a stripped-down injunction standard. Consequently, the Mid-
Con decision turned solely on a "long shot"-the court's ability to
quantify the probability of success on the merits. In the final anal-
ysis, MidCon is a shining example of old-fashioned injunction
analysis-rough justice at its best.
Using analysis similar to that used in MidCon, the court in
Nagy v. Custom Hoists, Inc.8 0 also denied plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction. In Nagy, however, the court construed
Judge Posner's decision in American Hospital Supply to require
consideration of each of the traditional preliminary injunction fac-
74. Id. at 1480.
75. Id. The court noted: "There are incalculable contingencies-actions by regulatory
agencies, MidCon's rescue by a 'white knight', actions by shareholders, changes in the natu-





79. Id. at 1482.
80. 629 F. Supp. 675 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
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tors. Indeed, the court recognized that the cardinal virtue of the
formula was that it required courts to evaluate each element
"rather than hang the parties' fate on just one or another of
them."81
In applying Judge Posner's formula, the Nagy court engaged
in a MidCon-like series of paradoxes and evasions. First, in order
to satisfy the requirement that the plaintiffs have no adequate
remedy at law, the court concluded that a damages award at the
conclusion of any trial "would be extremely speculative." 82 Second,
in order to calculate the balance of harms, the court found that the
plaintiffs "risk[ed] a moderate amount of irreparable harm. "83
Third, in assessing potential harm to the defendant of an errone-
ously granted injunction, the court found that "such harm roughly
balances the harm plaintiffs would suffer were the injunction
denied."84 Finally, the court noted that the probability of the
plaintiff's prevailing on the merits was "rather low" and that
neither party had demonstrated how the public interest would be
affected by the injunction. 5 Because the harms to the plaintiffs
and defendant roughly balanced and the public interest did not
alter that balance, the plaintiffs' lower probability of success at
trial was determinative. Accordingly, the court denied the
injunction 6
The Nagy decision parallels MidCon in all respects. While
paying lip-service to Posner's formula, the courts in both cases
were unable to quantify the formula's crucial variables. The
injunction decisions, therefore, turned on one element: the judges'
rough sense of the probability of success on the merits. Conse-
quently, except for the fact that Judge Posner's formula has added
an appearance of scientism to injunction decisions, nothing has
changed.
81. Id. at 679. "Under this test it would no longer seem adequate, if ever it was, for a
district court merely to announce that it 'finds' irreparable injury, or a likelihood of success,
without also assessing how substantial these factors are." Id.
82. Id. at 680. The court confessed that it was perplexed by the requirement that the
plaintiffs show inadequate remedy at law when they enjoyed a statutory exclusion from hav-
ing to show irreparable harm. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 681.
85. Id. at 682.
86. Id.
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III. THE SQUARE ROOTS OF FORMULA POSNER: ENGRAFTING
ECONOMETRICS ONTO THE LAW
A. Jeremy Bentham and the Felicific Calculus: Imposing
Mathematical Logic on the Law
Judge Posner's writings indicate that he harbors a grudging
respect for Jeremy Bentham, the nineteenth century philosopher
who last attempted to quantify the law. 7 Bentham postulated the
felicific calculus, a method of codifying the law based on the
"greatest happiness" utility principle.s As Judge Posner knows
very well, 9 Bentham's utilitarian ethics and felicific calculus long
have been discredited.90 Nonetheless, Bentham's methodology and
overarching criticisms of equity jurisdiction appeal greatly to
Judge Posner.
Bentham had little to say about injunctions, but what he did
say was not especially charitable. At best, Bentham considered
injunctive requests vexatious disruptions of an ongoing lawsuit. In
Bentham's words: "[A]n injunction is an entire suit, a second suit,
and that an equity one, piled upon the first. The common-law suit
is a dwarf; the equity suit, a giant mounted upon his shoulders."91
Bentham viewed injunctive proceedings as an abuse of process,
92
but he reserved true vituperation for equity jurisdiction: "When
common law had picked the bones of a cause, equity comes in and
sucks the marrow."9 " After noting that equity jurisdiction was
based on a "few scanty and incoherent scraps,"9' 4 Bentham con-
87. Bentham's voluminous writings are published in the multi-volume collection,
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (J. Bowring ed. 1843) [hereinafter BENTHAM WORKS]. For vari-
ous discussions of Bentham by Professor Posner, see Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra
note 36, at 281-83; POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 13-47. See also Leub-
sdorf, supra note 14, at 532.
88. See generally J. BENTHAM, A Fragment on Government; Or a Comment on the
Commentaries, in 1 BENTHAM WORKS, supra note 87, at 221; J. BENTHAM, An Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in 1 BENTHAM WORKS, supra, at 1. The "great-
est-happiness" or utility principle posited that "the test of sound social policy was whether
it promoted the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people." POSNER, ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 33 (citing Joseph Priestley as one of the many intellectual ante-
cedents of Bentham's greatest happiness utilitarianism).
89. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 50-60.
90. Utilitarian ethics and the notion of a felicific calculus subsequently were ques-
tioned by John Stuart Mill, Bentham's most famous disciple. See generally J. PLAMENATZ,
THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS (2d rev. ed. 1958).
91. 7 BENTHAM WORKS, supra note 87, at 299.
92. Id. at 299-300.




cluded his extended attack on equity jurisdiction with the follow-
ing rhetorical flourish: "Chaos is the grand rampart of chicane: and
for the organization of chaos, the services of equity have been
beyond price." 95 Bentham's wrath, however, was not reserved for
equity jurisdiction. He also was dismayed at evidentiary defects in
interlocutory proceedings, an insight that spurred the systematiza-
tion of equitable rules and the restraint of equitable discretion.9 6
Judge Posner goes to great lengths to distinguish his economic
analysis from Bentham's utilitarianism.97 Although diverting,
Judge Posner's argument proves too much. Judge Posner's wealth
maximization principle is undisputably distinguishable from Ben-
tham's greatest happiness theorem. This digression, however, dis-
guises Judge Posner's grudging admiration for the entirety of Ben-
tham's task-the rationalization and systematization of the law of
England.9 8 Specifically, one senses Judge Posner's palpable sympa-
thy for the perceived obstacles to Bentham's proposed judicial
reforms: "(1) the common law system of lawmaking, and the law-
yers and judges who had a vested interest in the system; (2) intel-
lectual confusion rooted in semantic ambiguity; and (3) England's
elaborately balanced, imperfectly representative governmental sys-
tem."9 9 If one substitutes "America" for "England" in the third
obstacle, Bentham's frustrations clearly are Judge Posner's.
According to Judge Posner, Bentham believed "that the major ob-
stacle to reform was the ignorance or confusion of the people in
power-if only their minds could be cleared, his suggested reforms
would be promptly implemented. And he thought intellectual con-
fusion was rooted in linguistic imprecision. Figurative language in
particular shielded people from recognizing the error of habitual
95. Id.
96. 2 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 276-86 (J.S. Mill ed. 1827); 4 J.
BENTHAM, supra, at 630-37. This point also is made by Professor Leubsdorf. See Leubsdorf,
supra note 14, at 532.
97. See PosxN~, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 48-87. Typical of this analysis
is the following:
My doubts that Benthamism, utilitarianism in its most uncompromising form, is an
adequate ethical system may seem also to undermine the economic analysis of law in
both its positive and normative versions .... The important question is whether utili-
tarianism and economics are distinguishable. I believe they are and that the economic
norm I shall call "wealth maximization" provides a firmer basis for ethical theory than
utilitarianism does.
Id. at 48.
98. See, e.g., id. at 35-39.
99. Id. at 36.
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belief." 100 Bentham's laments are Judge Posner's. If only Judge
Posner could sweep away ignorance and confusion in the minds of
judges and lawyers, economic analysis of the law would prevail
throughout the judicial system. 10 1 If Judge Posner had his way, lin-
guistic imprecision, particularly the conceptual muddiness embod-
ied in equity proceedings, would be abandoned in favor of scien-
tific expression of legal concepts.0 2
Judge Posner does not need elaborately to distance his intel-
lectual framework from Bentham's because no one seriously doubts
the distinctions between their underlying premises. 103 At heart,
however, the two economists are kindred spirits: "individual[s] of
prodigious intellect, energies, and good will."' 04 The only startling
thing is that Judge Posner is unable to recognize that his economic
approach to procedure is doomed for the same reasons that Ben-
tham's felicific calculus is so ridiculous.
105
B. Learned Hand and Algebraic Torts
In American Hospital Supply Judge Posner offered his pre-
liminary injunction formula as "a procedural counterpart to Judge
Learned Hand's famous negligence formula" articulated in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co.'0e The purpose of this reference, pre-
100. Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
101. See, e.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 382-84 & 388-89
(7th Cir. 1984). In Roland Machinery Judge Posner attacked imprecise language: "As so
often in law the trouble comes from using the same word in different senses." Id. at 388.
102. Judge Posner's lengthy preface to his error-minimizing mathematical approach is
a diatribe on the lack of clarity in current judicial standards. The key theme is the ambigu-
ity and "blurred picture" imprecise language causes, which of course can be remedied by
quantification:
Our discussion of the standard for ruling on requests for preliminary injunctions, and
of the standard for appellate review of such rulings, should have made clear that it is
not possible to reconcile all the precedents, or even just all the ones in this circuit. But
the apparent discord is mostly verbal. Beneath the welter of apparently conflicting
precedents we sense agreement on the following principles ....
Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 385-86.
103. Professor Posner quite clearly draws this distinction himself: "I have tried to de-
velop a moral theory that goes beyond classical utilitarianism and holds that the criterion
for judging whether acts and institutions are just or good is whether they maximize the
wealth of society." PosNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 115. See generally id. at
48-115.
104. Id. at 41. Professor Posner writes of Bentham: "His unexamined faith in his own
altruistic motivation and in the power of individual intellect (his own), his restless do-good-
ism, his love of mechanical and intellectual gimmickry, his impatient prose, his neologisms
... but above all, his faith in plans, make him uncannily contemporary." Id. at 42.
105. For Posner's critique of utilitarian ethics, see id. at 48-87.
106. 780 F.2d at 593, citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
1987]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
sumably, is to reinforce the use of a mathematical construct in a
procedural context with an analog from substantive law. This fly-
ing buttress of support, so to speak, collapses for two reasons.
First, Judge Hand's formula simply is not famous, in any sense.
Second, this analog from tort law is not transferable to procedure.
Judge Posner's characterization of the Hand negligence
formula as "famous" is highly overstated, unless he means "fa-
mous" in the Andy Warholian sense.107 If fame is measured by
acceptance in judicial canons, the Hand formula is barely famous
and certainly not successful. In the forty years since its explication,
the formula has been utilized four times, all in Seventh Circuit
decisions written by none other than Judge Posner.10 8 Thus, Judge
Posner is the great popularizer of Hand's negligence formula and is
directly responsible for whatever current fame it enjoys.
More seriously, the negligence formula is not a methodology
transferable to procedure. The Hand formula posits three vari-
ables: (1) B, the burden of taking the precautions necessary to
avert an accident; (2) L, the loss incurred if an accident occurs;
and (3) P, the probability of an accident occurring if precautions
are not taken. An alleged tortfeasor is negligent where B < PL:
where the burden of taking necessary precautions is less than the
harm incurred if the accident occurs, discounted by the probability
that it might occur.109 Although Judge Posner suggests that these
variables need not be quantified, 1 0 they can be spelled out to yield
a mathematically precise result. This simply is not true for prelim-
inary injunctions. As Judge Swygert aptly noted:
A quantitative approach may be an appropriate and useful heuristic device in
determining negligence in tort cases, but it has limited value in determining
whether a preliminary injunction should issue. Proceedings in equity and
cases sounding in tort demand entirely different responses of a district judge.
The judgment of the district judge in a tort case must be definite; the judg-
ment of a district judge in an injunction proceeding cannot, by its very na-
ture, be as definite.11'
Cir. 1947).
107. Andy Warhol is noted for his famous epigram: "In the future everyone will be
famous for fifteen minutes." See Warhol, dictum 1960s, in MORROW'S INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY QUOTATIONS 80 (J. Green ed. 1982).
108. Davis v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 788 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1986); Ameri-
can Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 593; Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1564 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026
(7th Cir. 1982).
109. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173.
110. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 683 F.2d at 1026 (7th Cir. 1982).
111. American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 609.
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It is not surprising that Judge Learned Hand's not-so-famous
negligence formula has failed to gain acceptance in tort law. The
formula has been fairly criticized for its emphasis on economic effi-
ciency and lack of concern for human variables and individual
rights.1 1 2 Judge Posner's attempt to engraft a mathematical model
onto an equity proceeding is subject to similar criticisms, but on an
even larger scale.
C. John Leubsdorf on Preliminary Injunctions
1. Minimizing Error Through Probabilistic Calculations
In a 1978 article 13 Professor John Leubsdorf laid the ground-
work for Judge Posner's preliminary injunction formula.11 4 Indeed,
the criticisms sounded in that article are repeated in Judge Pos-
ner's preliminary injunction decisions. 1 5 Professor Leubsdorf
explored three major themes: (1) the incoherence of the prelimi-
nary injunction standard; (2) the inadequacies of equitable maxims
in injunctive proceedings; and (3) the goal of minimizing error
through a balancing of harms to litigants. Far from a novel con-
struct, Judge Posner's formula is derived completely from Profes-
sor Leubsdorf's work.
Professor Leubsdorf correctly recognized the unsatisfactory
state of preliminary injunction law. He noted that the injunction
standard suffered from inconsistent formulations 16 and suggested
that courts had little reason for choosing one formulation over
another. Preliminary injunction law rested on no coherent theory,
and often the standard bore little relation to the result in any
case.117 Professor Leubsdorf also demonstrated that no major theo-
112. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§ 31, n.46 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS] (citing Rodgers, Negli-
gence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1980);
Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental
Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617 (1973); Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A
Normative Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REv.
465 (1978)).
113. Leubsdorf, supra note 14, at 525.
114. See American Hosp. Supply, 780 F.2d at 594; see also Roland Mach. Co. v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 396 (7th Cir. 1984) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
115. See, e.g., Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 382-86.
116. See Leubsdorf, supra note 14, at 526-40. "This dizzying diversity of formulations,
unaccompanied by any explanation for choosing one instead of another, strongly suggests
that the phrases used by the courts have little impact on the result in particular cases." Id.
at 526.
117. Id. at 526-40.
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retical advancements have occurred in preliminary injunction law
in more than a century, despite legislative attempts to codify a
standard. Instead, "traditional language filtered back into the
jurisprudence . . by way of statutory construction that preserved
judicial discretion to deny relief under equitable principles even
when the plaintiff met the statutory tests."11 The major practical
problems faced by judges making preliminary injunction decisions
involve "vague balancing," "vague inherited phrases," and intuitive
analysis:'19 themes echoed by Judge Posner.120
Professor Leubsdorf's critique of equitable decisionmaking
leads naturally to his proposal for a preliminary injunction model
that minimizes "the probable irreparable loss of rights caused by
errors incident to hasty decision.'1' The purpose of adopting a
more specific injunction standard is to decrease the number of
incorrect interlocutory relief decisions. The key to Professor
Leubsdorf's analysis, then, is to minimize harm by investigating
the impact of an erroneous interim decision. In assessing harm to
legal rights, courts should consider two factors: (1) the likelihood
of prevailing on the merits at trial; and (2) "the probable loss of
rights to each party if it acts on a view of the merits that proves to
be erroneous.' 1 22 The court must choose the course that inflicts the
least irreparable harm. Professor Leubsdorf describes the court's
role as follows:
The court, in theory, should assess the probable irreparable loss of rights an
injunction would cause by multiplying the probability that the defendant will
prevail by the amount of irreparable loss that the defendant would suffer if
enjoined from exercising what turns out to be his legal right. It should then
make a similar calculation of the probable irreparable loss of rights to the
plaintiff from denying the injunction. Whichever course promises the smaller
probable loss should be adopted."2 3
Judge Posner clearly adopted this verbal formulation wholesale in
a series of preliminary injunction cases, culminating in American
Hospital Supply.
118. Id. at 538.
119. Id. at 540 ("Much of the precision, however, is illusory; except in the few cases
where one of the preliminary inquiries succeeds, courts must proceed to the vague balancing
stage .... Although the vague inherited phrases used by courts may conceal differing ap-
proaches to the preliminary injunction, examination of the cases yields the impression that
judges on both sides of the Atlantic are struggling with the same problem in much the same
way.").
120. See, e.g., Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 382-86 (7th Cir. 1984).
121. Leubsdorf, supra note 14, at 541.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 542 (footnote omitted).
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Although he concedes that "reducing this model to hard
figures is usually impractical," '124 the guts of Professor Leubsdorf's
proposal is its illustration. Professor Leubsdorf posited the follow-
ing example in order to illustrate his analysis:
Suppose the plaintiff is an indigent who claims additional welfare payments
of $20 per month. With these payments, he could buy food in bulk at reduced
rates, increasing his purchasing power by $32 per month. If five months will
elapse before final judgment, the defendant agency has $100 at stake and the
plaintiff $160. Although calculable, these potential losses are irreparable be-
cause the plaintiff is judgment-proof and the defendant has sovereign immu-
nity from a judgment for payments due in previous months. The judge also
estimates that the plaintiff's claim has a 40. chance of success at trial."2
Having hypothesized these facts and assumptions, Professor
Leubsdorf argued that a judge can calculate accurately the poten-
tial irreparable harm to the litigants of an erroneously granted
injunction:
If the defendant must pay the plaintiff's claim during the litigation, it will
spend $100 with a 60% chance that the payments will be found legally
unnecessary. Therefore, the defendant's probable irreparable loss of rights
from the grant of relief is $60. The plaintiff's probable irreparable loss from
the denial of relief, based on a similar calculation, is 40% of $160, or $64.
Since the estimated $64 loss from denying relief exceeds the estimated $60
loss from granting it, the judge should grant a preliminary injunction."'
Professor Leubsdorf argued that this mathematical assessment
of injunctive relief is preferable because it renders a just result
that otherwise might be counterintuitive. For example, in the
above hypothetical, a judge might intuitively have concluded that
the defendant's greater probability of success outweighed the
plaintiff's greater potential injury.12 7 Professor Leubsdorf further
argued that this approach is superior because it eliminates subjec-
tive value judgments that might cloud a judge's evaluations, such
as "vague generalizations about the impact of deprivations on the
poor or the need to protect the public from bogus claimants." 128s
2. The Fallacies of Applied Econometrics in Civil Procedure
Although Professor Leubsdorf's example is seductive, when
carefully scrutinized it illustrates the frailties of Benthamizing pro-
cedural motions. Professor Leubsdorf's example is deceptively
124. Id.
125. Id. (footnotes omitted).
126. Id. (footnote omitted).




appealing because it hypothesizes a situation in which a highly
sympathetic plaintiff, an indigent welfare recipient, is pitted
against an unsympathetic defendant, a cold government bureau-
cracy, and benefits from a mathematical approach to a legal di-
lemma. Professor Leubsdorf's example, however, is less than credi-
ble to the extent that it is predicated on a rarely occurring factual
basis, when both the plaintiff and defendant are conveniently judg-
ment-proof--one because of indigency and the other because of
sovereign immunity. This highly exotic factual situation is neces-
sary, of course, to set the stage for Professor Leubsdorf's assertion
of a potential irreparable loss that is nonetheless quantifiable with
precision. Life, not to mention preliminary injunction cases, is
rarely so thoughtfully tidy.
The major defects in Professor Leubsdorf's approach have lit-
tle to do with manipulated facts. Professor Leubsdorf's formula-
tion suffers from four essential problems: (1) unsound premises; (2)
uncertain probabilistic assessments; (3) implicit subjectivity; and
(4) illusory objectivity. These same problems apply equally to
Judge Posner's formula and ultimately serve as bases for critiquing
the application of mathematical models to procedural motions in
general.
a. Unsound First Premises
Professor Leubsdorf's example is premised on an indigent
plaintiff who, with an additional twenty dollars per month in wel-
fare benefits, could buy bulk food at reduced rates and thus in-
crease his purchasing power by thirty-two dollars per month. This
thirty-two dollars per month increase provides the plaintiff with a
one hundred sixty dollar stake in the outcome of the injunction
proceeding over a five-month period. The welfare agency's stake in
the outcome, on the other hand, is one hundred dollars. Although
facially appealing, this fundamental premise is an unsound eco-
nomic sleight-of-hand. In fact, the indigent's additional twenty
dollars per month will buy only twenty dollars worth of groceries,
not the thirty-two dollars worth that Professor Leubsdorf would
have us believe. Professor Leubsdorf's reference to bulk purchasing
is misleading, because while bulk purchasing does effectively lower
the cost of goods to the purchaser, the purchaser could not resell
twenty dollars worth of bulk groceries for thirty-two dollars on the
open market. Professor Leubsdorf realizes this, 2 ' but he would
129. See id. at 542 n.95 ("Assume that the impact of this change on the grocer is
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rather have us believe that the indigent plaintiff has a real, addi-
tional twelve dollar stake in the outcome of the proceeding solely
because of bulk purchasing. This twelve dollars, however, is not a
tangible value recieved from the welfare agency, but merely the
subjective worth to the indigent of the additional groceries
purchasable with a twenty dollar increase in welfare benefits.
Once this economic fact is understood, Professor Leubsdorf's
calculations are altered radically. If the additional twelve dollars
per month is excluded from the calculations, the plaintiff's and the
defendant's stakes are the same: one hundred dollars. Assuming
that the plaintiff's probability of success on the merits is forty per-
cent and the defendant's is sixty percent, the court should deny
the injunction. Because the potential injury to the plaintiff and the
defendant are the same, the "likelihood of success on the merits"
factor tips the balance. Obviously, this result is the opposite of
Professor Leubsdorf's outcome, but it dramatically demonstrates
how unsound premises will dictate unsound results.
As the above analysis of Professor Leubsdorf's preliminary
injunction formula demonstrates, the outcome of a mathematically
calculated procedural motion is manipulated easily. Clearly, one
effective method of influencing results is to control assumptions
and premises. This method of influencing results is not all that dif-
ferent from the usual litigation scenario. With quantification as the
operational standard, however, the role of the attorney is changed
greatly. Now, the attorney who marshals the best numbers more
likely than not will prevail. The more effective the attorney is at
weighting crucial assumptions, the greater the chance of proce-
dural success. At a practical level, the academic economist is likely
to become a necessary adjunct in basic litigation strategy, with
procedural maneuvering reduced to a swearing contest between
economists. This will contribute to, rather than reduce, direct costs
of litigation and will make basic procedural motions more complex
and inscrutable.
Moreover, by concentrating on manipulating premises, attor-
neys, in many instances, may ignore selected unquantifiable fac-
tors, such as a litigant's risk-taking disposition. Professor Leubs-
dorf summarily dismisses this criticism, noting that "[a]ttitudes
toward risk are hard to measure in a contentious context, and it is
negligible or legally irrelevant."). Professor Leubsdorf must concede this because it econom-
ically is correct; the indigent's subjective valuation has no relationship to the reality of the
grocer's inventory or sales.
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not clear that such personal propensities should affect one's
rights. 13 0 Although a surprising admission from an advocate of
mathematical procedure, this statement accurately captures the
essence of the problem. If anything, attitudes toward risk certainly
are ascertainable-simply ask the client. Yet the error-minimiza-
tion approach discounts the human element of risk-taking, denying
the risk-taker or the risk-averter the opportunity to influence the
conduct of the litigation."' Thus, personal propensity with regard
to one's rights is sacrificed on the high altar of mathematical
precision.
b. Uncertain Probabilistic Assessments
In Professor Leubsdorf's hypothetical, the judge estimated
that the plaintiff had a forty percent chance of success at trial.
Based on this probability, the judge assessed the potential harm to
the plaintiff and the defendant at sixty dollars and sixty-four dol-
lars, respectively. Therefore, it is apparent that the judge's esti-
mate of the parties' probability of success on the merits militated
in favor of granting an injunction.
This probabilistic assessment suffers from three major flaws.
First, the assignation of a value to the probability component is
crucial to the outcome of the injunction proceeding. This flaw is
illustrated by the following table of values for Professor Leubs-
dorf's example:
Defendant's Defendant's Probability Defendant's Potential




Plaintiff's Plaintiff's Probability Plaintiffs Potential




Assuming a forty percent chance of success at trial, the plain-
tiff's irreparable loss exceeds the defendant's. Suppose, however,
130. Id. at 554 n.148.
131. Id.
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that the judge estimated the plaintiff's chances of success at thirty-
nine percent. Under Leubsdorf's calculations, the plaintiff's irrepa-
rable harm would exceed the defendant's by $1.40. Should the
judge grant the injunction? If one lowers the plaintiff's chance of
success by one more percentage point, the defendant's loss exceeds
the plaintiff's by $1.20. Should the judge deny the motion? Clearly,
this is a lot of silliness, but perhaps not. At a thirty-nine percent
probability, the judge must make a marginal judgment call; only
two percentage points separate different outcomes. The mathemat-
ics are very precise, but should a $1.20 difference dictate an injunc-
tion? If judges must quantify the probability of success under the
Posner formula, such questionable mathematical logic will prevail.
The second and more problematic flaw from which this proba-
bilistic assessment suffers is the process by which the judge quanti-
fies the probability. How does Professor Leubsdorf's judge arrive
at a forty-percent value for the plaintiff's chance of success on the
merits? Is not any such figure a "statistical myth," basically an
intuitive guess by the judge? Despite the intuitive nature of this
decision, however, Professor Leubsdorf considers this "[p]erhaps
the most manageable part of the preliminary injunction deci-
sion." 132 Leubsdorf suggests that the judge can base his estimation
on affidavits, counsels' representations, inferences from a failure to
produce accessible evidence, and "the judge's own notions about
the plausibility of the parties' contentions."'3 3 "This process,"
states Professor Leubsdorf, "while far from ideal, is not
outlandish. .. .
In fact, this proposed process is outlandish because of the
third major flaw in Professor Leubsdorf's approach-religious faith
in the use of mathematical models, especially probability theory,"3 5
in the decisionmaking process. Professor Leubsdorf argues that
"[jiudges as well as private decisionmakers often weigh alternative
courses of action by considering the possible outcomes in light of
their probability of occurrence."' 18 Not surprisingly, Professor
Leubsdorf supports his contention with Judge Learned Hand's
132. Id. at 555.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 555-56.
135. Id. at 543. "Such mathematical expectations of profit or loss are familiar tools in
decisionmaking theory." Id., citing R. CARNAP, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROBABILITY 260-79
(2d ed. 1962); 1. HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF
EARLY IDEAS ABOUT PROBABILITY, INDUCTION AND STATISTICAL INFERENCE 92-98 (1975); J.
KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 311 n.1 (1921).
136. Leubsdorf, supra note 14, at 543.
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decision in Carroll Towing and Judge Posner's article on negli-
gence formulas.137 Thus doth the law feed on itself.
One reason civil procedure is so susceptible to quantification is
that procedural motions are permeated with probabilistic assess-
ments. For example, consider the threshold consideration for per-
sonal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in articulating the standard
governing constitutionally permissible exercises of personal juris-
diction, has characterized the appropriate inquiry as whether "the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there."13 In the calculus of personal jurisdiction, therefore, "rea-
sonable anticipation" is the factor admitting of probabilistic
assessment. Indeed, any procedural motion turning on questions of
reasonableness or adequacy involves probabilistic calculations. 3
Are these probabilities assessable? Professor Posner thinks so,
because he readily embraces statistical methodology:
An economic approach that explained 90 percent of some set of legal rules or
outcomes would be judged strikingly successful by the standards of social sci-
ence, but it would leave the legal practitioner with a hollow feeling if he had a
case to which the unexplained 10 percent of the precedents were relevant.140
Professor Posner errs by believing that economic analysis ever can
explain ninety percent of litigation outcomes and that even ninety
percent, if ascertainable, is adequate. Professor Posner, however,
disparages those who worry about the inexplicable ten percent:
Perhaps this is why many legal scholars are suspicious of the application of
economics to law. They feel that more is needed to explain 100 percent of the
outcomes and that the whole 100 percent must be given some explanation,
however flabby, lest the practitioner be caught with nothing to say when
asked to interpret or distinguish a precedent arguably applicable to his
case.141
Statistical applications in procedural contexts are woefully
misplaced. Statistical probabilities work fine at the gaming table,
where six faces of the die or fifty-two cards of the deck admit of
recurring events, but it is impossible to conceive of a procedural
context inviting such repetitive generalization, certainly not ninety
percent. Every litigation is sui generis. The practicing attorney,
therefore, is not misguided in demanding explanation for one hun-
137. Id. at 543 n.101. (Judge Posner's article is A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 29 (1972)).
138. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
139. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b) & 23(a), (b).
140. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra note 36, at 302.
141. Id.
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dred percent of cases. Explaining ninety percent of cases may have
some scientific value or interest, but deciding ninety percent of
cases correctly is different, indeed.
Although probability statistics are employed appropriately in
certain substantive contexts-for example, actuarial assessments of
damages in wrongful death actions142 -these calculations are
highly inapt in evaluating a litigant's success on the merits. Statis-
tical probabilities are valid because they are based on hundreds of
repetitive events and outcomes. In litigation, however, no two
events ever are the same; there are too many actors and variables
to permit statistical generalization. Even assuming that hundreds
of indigent injunction plaintiffs opposed administrative agencies,
calculating those plaintiffs' probability of success would depend
solely on one judge's experience with similar cases. Realistically,
any particular judge's statistical sample would be far too small to
generate a realistic value for probability.
c. Implicit Subjectivity
Although Professor Leubsdorf's model aspires to make the
injunctive deliberation more precise, the model is littered annoy-
ingly with implicit subjectivity. For instance, although Professor
Leubsdorf concludes that his hypothesized plaintiff and defendant
have one hundred sixty dollars and one hundred dollars at stake
respectively, he is compelled to note that "[t]hese figures differ be-
cause the parties have different perspectives, just as in a free
speech case the claimed right to distribute pamphlets may have a
value different from the claimed right to prevent littering.
'143
Herein lies a large tale, because the values assigned to rights by the
litigants necessarily are permeated with subjective considerations.
In Professor Leubsdorf's example, twenty dollars worth of grocer-
ies is worth a subjective thirty-two dollars to the plaintiff. Well,
why not thirty-five dollars? At a thirty-five dollar value, assuming
a thirty-eight percent chance of winning on the merits, the plaintiff
should be granted an injunction-a result not mandated at a
thirty-two dollar valuation. This simple example demonstrates
that the values assigned to litigants' rights are manipulated easily
and that a plaintiff desiring an injunction will succeed by placing a
greater value on his or her alleged rights. In the extreme case, Pro-
fessor Leubsdorf's formula permits the highest bidder to purchase
142. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 112, § 127, at 949-50.
143. Leubsdorf, supra note 14, at 542 n.96.
19871
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
an injunction, a result obnoxious to equity jurisdiction. 44
The point of this argument is not that subjectivity is evil.
Rather, the point is that Professor Leubsdorf's model and Judge
Posner's formula give the false impression that they eliminate sub-
jectivity in the injunctive process. On the contrary, subjective ele-
ments exist throughout the process in assessments of rights, poten-
tial harms, real injuries, and probabilities of success. Imperfect as
the traditional injunction standard is, it recognizes and accounts
for these subjective valuations. The judge, sitting in equity, medi-
ates these values and renders justice in a flexible manner. What
the traditional process lacks in precision it makes up for in intel-
lectual honesty.
The calculus of civil procedure is disingenuous because it di-
verts attention from the subjective elements of the decisionmaking
process. Subjectivity, however, is not eliminated from the process.
It merely is obscured in the complexities of algebraic babble. Liti-
gants are not ciphers, and quantification of variables necessarily
entails subjective valuation. As litigants become more savvy, proce-
dural maneuvering will be transformed into a bidding contest. As
the preliminary injunction formula clearly demonstrates, personal
propensities simply will be channelled into pseudo-objective
valuations.
A more problematic concern, however, is the task of judges.
Judging, as we know it, necessarily is subjective; judges render de-
cisions in conformity with precedent and rules, taking into account
changed factual situations. If Judge Posner is correct, and proce-
dure is reducible to a set of equations, then what is the judge's
role? Perhaps judges could be dispensed with altogether. As long
as judges are desirable, however, we should not be deluded con-
cerning the nature of their function and the limitations of their
abilities. Professor Michelman has captured this critique:
A related question, I believe, is: What does Posner mean when he says judges
should be "cautioned" not to adopt economic discourse explicitly? If, as he
suggests, wealth maximization is "the only value that a system of common
law rulemaking can effectively promote," and if allowing judicial considera-
144. See Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 397 (Swygert, J., dissenting):
The interlocutory injunction developed in England in the courts of equity. Like other
equitable remedies, injunctions were designed to offer relief when legal remedies were
unavailable or inadequate to protect the parties' rights. Thus, it has been said that
equity developed to relieve the harshness of the law. Despite the merger in our federal
system of equity and law courts, a preliminary injunction is still considered an ex-
traordinary remedy that is granted not as a matter of right.
Id. (citation omitted).
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tion of other "'justice' factors... would introduce an unacceptable degree of
subjectivity and uncertainty into the judicial process," how are we not forced
to insist that our judges both learn economics correctly and use it openly?
One does not, presumably, want judges acting irresponsibly, unaccountably,
vagrantly, capriciously, or in a muddle. If one also does not think "justice
factors" (wealth maximization aside) can supply a coherent or intelligible dis-
cipline for judges, how does one avoid the conclusion that a judge is censura-
ble for not mastering and correctly applying economic theory? 145
It is a difficult enough task to select federal judges who are
competent in knowledge and understanding of the law. If Professor
Posner's views prevail and Professor Michelman is correct, Con-
gress will have the additional task of confirming judicial candidates
schooled in both law and economics. Even then, any claimed ana-
lytical objectivity surely would not mask the subjective biases of
both litigants and judges.
d. Illusory Objectivity
The problem of illusory objectivity is related closely to the
problem of implicit subjectivity. After admitting that the parties to
an injunctive proceeding have different perspectives, which give
rise to different values, Professor Leubsdorf further concedes:
"Ultimately, one party's view of the merits and the valuation con-
sistent with it will prevail. In the meantime, the judge must con-
sider each party's perspective.' 146 This statement encapsulates the
fundamental problem with Professor Leubsdorf's model-while it
appears to embody objectivity, in reality, it disguises a large
amount of subjectivity. Each party's valuations, as well as the
judge's assessment of those valuations, are highly subjective. Pro-
fessor Leubsdorf, in referring to the measurement of irreparable
loss and the estimation of probable outcomes, concedes that
"[c]ourts must resort to intuitive analysis in which the objective
impact of the loss and its significance in light of relevant legal poli-
cies blend with some degree of personal judgment,"'' 7 but recog-
nizes that "similar problems are overcome more or less crudely
elsewhere in the law; judges balance incommensurable policies, and
juries calculate damages for the loss of an arm without the help of
a limb market.'
48
Through his model, Professor Leubsdorf desires to eliminate
145. Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U.
CH!. L. REv. 307, 314 (1979) (footnote omitted).
146. Leubsdorf, supra note 14, at 542 n.96.
147. Id. at 554.
148. Id. at 554-55.
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the "bromides" and "shibboleths" surrounding injunctive analysis
and to encourage a correct decision." 9 Notwithstanding his model's
apearance of objectivity, Professor Leubsdorf characterizes the
basic judgments essential to an injunction decision as "estimates"
and "predictions."' 150 These characterizations are necessary because
the objectivity he desires is unattainable. Indeed, in commenting
on Professor Posner's efforts to quantify procedure, even Professor
Leubsdorf recognized the limits of Posner's task, stating: "More
elaborate analysis can improve the accuracy of preliminary adjudi-
cation, but only by making it more cumbersome and expensive."151
The central evil of illusory objectivity is that it conceals the
true basis for decision and, therefore, increases the possibility of
manipulation. Thus, the final objection to a calculus of civil proce-
dure is simply that it is fraudulent. Formulas and calculations give
the appearance of precise measurement, but, in reality, such objec-
tivity is a mere chimera. Judges should not be clothing their deci-
sions in an aura of objectivity when the truly objective is unattain-
able. Professor Tribe accurately articulated the inherent
limitations in quantifying procedure:
[T]here may be at least some inherent limitations in the linking of mathe-
matics to procedural rulemaking-limitations arising in part from the ten-
dency of more readily quantifiable variables to dwarf those that are harder to
measure, in part from the uneasy partnership of mathematical precision and
certain important values, in part from the possible incompatibility of mathe-
matics with open-ended and deliberately ill-defined formulations, and in part
from the intrinsic difficulty of applying techniques of maximization to the
rich fabric of ritual and to the selection of ends as opposed to the specifica-
tion of means.
152
D. Judge Posner's Economic Analysis for Nonmarket Legal
Transactions
1. A Digression on Insulating One's Self from Criticism
Professor Posner is a formidable opponent because he effec-
tively disarms would-be challengers with caustic criticism. Those
who may question Professor Posner's views are alleged to suffer
from one or all of three intellectual shortcomings: (1) the inability
149. Id. at 545-46. "The danger of incorrect preliminary assessment is the key to the
analysis of interlocutory relief." Id. at 541.
150. See, e.g., id. at 542-43, 549, 551 & 554-55.
151. Id. at 549 n.122 (citing Posner, Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
supra note 8).
152. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1393 (1971).
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to distinguish normative from positivist analysis;153 (2) the ten-
dency to confuse normative economics with utilitarianism; 154 and
(3) a simple lack of economic understanding.155 Professor Posner's
critics, therefore, fall into two camps: either economics dunder-
heads or fuzzy-headed sentimentalists. According to Professor Pos-
ner, his critics are variously ignorant, confused, or reductionist. 5 6
With those parries in store for the would-be challenger, it is not
surprising that few confront Professor Posner.
Professor Posner's defenses, however, do not withstand scru-
tiny and certainly should not insulate him from criticism. For
example, Professor Posner long has argued that his goal is purely
positivist, rather than normative, and that his critics are unable to
distinguish "between the use of economic analysis to argue for
what should be and the use of economic analysis to explain what is
or has been or to predict what will be."'157 Professor Posner would
have his readers believe that his task, like Newtonian physics, is
purely scientific:
I am personally less interested in normative economic analysis of law in any
form than in positive economic analysis of law. "Positive analysis" refers, as I
have suggested, to the attempt to understand and explain, rather than im-
prove, the world. Explanation is the domain of science, and economics is the
science of rational behavior. It should be possible to study behavior regulated
by the legal system and even the behavior of the system itself through the
methods of economics viewed as a science rather than as an ideology or ethi-
cal system.' 58
Although logically appealing, Professor Posner's distinction
between positive and normative economic analysis makes sense
153. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra note 36, at 284-87.
154. See POSNER, EcoNoMics OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 48-87; Posner, Utilitarian-
ism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
155. See Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra note 36, at 297-306. "Judge Sneed's
opinion in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, [is] a good example of the adage, 'a little learning is a
dangerous thing,' applied to economics .... The court's discussion ... evinces a misun-
derstanding of the applicable economics." Id. at 297-99 (footnotes omitted).
156. Id. at 297-306; Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Pro-
fessor West, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1431 (1986).
157. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra note 36, at 285. Professor Posner is piqued
by woolly-head attorneys concerned with extraneous conceptions such as "the good":
Yet it is a distinction that lawyers have difficulty getting straight because they are
inveterately normative, and it is a common source of confusion because many of the
criticisms that are properly leveled at normative economic analysis are inapplicable to
positive economic analysis. For example, that it may be hard to show that "efficient" is
a synonym for "good" does not bear, at least directly, on the question whether the
hypothesis that the common law is efficiency-promoting is supported by the evidence.
Id.
158. Id. at 287.
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only if he is not interested in legal reform. Because he is interested
in legal reform, however, this is a distinction without a difference.
As a judge, Professor Posner now is able to transform his percep-
tion of "what is" into his view of "what ought to be." One should
recall that Jeremy Bentham was a legal reformer first and foremost
and an ethicist only incidentally. Judge Posner's task is the same,
regardless of how he characterizes his analysis.
Professor Posner's attempts to disassociate his thinking from
utilitarianism also fail.159 While, on the one hand, he informs us
that his economic analysis of the law is scientific, as opposed to
ideological or ethical;16 0 on the other, he tells us that his wealth
maximization principle "provides a firmer basis for ethical theory
than utilitarianism does."'" Perhaps Professor Posner is confused,
or perhaps he cannot discern when the positive becomes norma-
tive. More likely, Professor Posner knows precisely what he is do-
ing-promoting normative reformation under the guise of objective
scientism.
Thus, Professor Posner has it both ways; he ambiguously waf-
fles between roles as a scientist and an ethicist. Adding to this role
confusion, he claims that critical ethicists are misguided because
they do not understand economic analysis:
It is therefore not surprising that among the severest critics of the economic
approach to law are those who attack it as a version of utilitarianism. Their
procedure is to equate economics with utilitarianism and then attack utilita-
rianism. Whether they follow this procedure because they are more comforta-
ble with the terminology of philosophy than with that of the social sciences or
because they want to exploit the current philosophical hostility to utilitarian-
ism is of no moment.
1 62
Professor Posner is equally contemptuous of academic lawyers
who question social science applications to the law.163 Clearly, in
159. See supra note 153.
160. See supra note 158.
161. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 48.
162. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Epstein, The Next Generation of Legal Scholar-
ship?, 30 STAN. L. REV. 635 (1978) and Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its
Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979)).
163. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra note 36, at 287-91. Posner sees his chief
academic-lawyer critics as Grant Gilmore, the author of The Ages of American Law (1977),
and Arthur Leff. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra, at 287 n.25; see also Bloustein,
Privacy is Dear at Any Price: A Response to Professor Posner's Economic Theory, 12 GA. L.
Rev. 429 (1978); Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra, at 301-06 (Professor Posner's re-
sponse). For a challenge to Professor Posner's wealth-maximization framework from a hu-
manities approach, see the recent exchange between Professors West and Posner in 99
HARV. L. REv. 1431, 1441 (1985). For further questioning of the economics approach, see also
Tribe, supra note 63, at 592; Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 622 (Easterbrook's response) (as
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Professor Posner's universe one is either an economics initiate or
not: "economics is a distinct form of intellectual activity from phil-
osophical utilitarianism; it has a technical vocabulary, theorems,
and methodology of which a utilitarian philosopher might be-and
many are in fact-unaware. ' ' 164 Professor Posner, therefore, enter-
tains discourse only from fellow economists, most of whom, not
surprisingly, agree with him. The law-and-economics coterie is re-
markably incestuous and cannot tolerate interdisciplinary fools."6 5
With the exception of Jeremy Bentham, it is difficult to recall such
intellectual arrogance in the history of thought.
Professor Posner's insularity is particularly obnoxious because
it does not allow for the possibility of intelligent discourse. His de-
fense is basically tautological: Only those schooled in economics
can understand his analysis, but anyone so schooled must be con-
vinced of their soundness. Critics who question his premises or
theoretical framework, therefore, are woefully misguided. 6' As
Professor Posner himself admits, those who challenge his analysis
must meet him on his ground: "A concrete demonstration of where
and how the positive economic analysis of law fails would be more
persuasive than the attempt . . . to dismiss the whole of social
science."1 67
indicated earlier, Professor Easterbrook is a fellow co-author and Judge on the Seventh
Circuit with Judge Posner); Heller, The Importance of Normative Decision-making: The
Limitations of Legal Economics as a Basis For a Liberal Jurisprudence-As Illustrated By
The Regulation of Vacation Home Development, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 385; Michelman, supra
note 145; Tribe, supra note 152.
164. POSNER, EcONOMICS OF JusTicE, supra note 7, at 49.
165. See, e.g., Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra note 36, at 301-06. Typical of
Posner's approach: "Among his other economic errors, Professor Bloustein garbles the eco-
nomic concept of scarcity." Id. at 305. On Judge Sneed's decision in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,
501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974), Posner wrote: "But Judge Sneed's effort to articulate his rea-
soning in economic terms was disastrous." Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra, at 300.
See generally id. at 297-306 (Posner's criticisms); Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free
Choice, supra note 156.
166. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra note 36, at 288.
The strategy of [the critics] is a curious one. Instead of analyzing the positive economic
analysis of law on its merits-examining its theoretical consistency, its ability to ex-
plain data, and so forth-they address, necessarily in very general terms, the much






2. From Professor to Judge-Transgressing the Normative
Distinction
Judge Posner has crossed the great divide between the posi-
tive and the normative. He has, with his preliminary injunction
formula, moved beyond mere academic debate to procedural
reform by acting on his view of what the law ought to be. It is not
unfair, then, to question the uses of social science methodology in
legal settings. In the final analysis, however, Judge Posner can be
met on his own terms because his positive economic analysis of the
preliminary injunction decision fails both in theory and practical
application.
1 6
During the last fifteen years, Judge Posner has devoted his
energies to construing legal and social problems from an economics
perspective, culminating in two major works: An Economic Analy-
sis of Law1 69 and The Economics of Justice.7 0 As he explains, eco-
nomic analysis of the law has two strands. The traditional branch
is concerned with the legal ramifications of market transactions
and includes the study of antitrust, taxation, corporations, utilities
regulation, and international trade. The second branch addresses
legal concepts regulating nonmarket activities. Pioneering works in
nonmarket behavior include those of Professors Becker, Calabresi,
and Coase. 71 This second branch of economic application domi-
nates Professor Posner's work. His basic hypothesis is that judges
function to maximize economic welfare and that an economic
structure is discoverable in legal rules, procedures, and out-
comes. 172 Consequently, the common law and legal doctrine
"uncannily follows economics":
The hypothesis is not that the judges can or do duplicate the results of com-
petitive markets, but that within the limits set by the costs of administering
the legal system ... common law adjudication brings the economic system
closer to the results that would be produced by effective competition-a free
market operating without significant externality, monopoly, or information
problems. 73
168. See supra Part III(C)(2).
169. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6.
170. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 7.
171. Id. at 1-9; see also Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra note 36, at 281-84.
172. See, e.g., Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra note 36, at 290-91 ("[N]umerous
studies ... have found a convergence, frequently subtle and unexpected, between the corn
mon-law rules and the implications of economic theory.. . . Nevertheless, it is striking..
how wide a range of rules, outcomes, procedures, and institutions appear to support the
efficiency hypothesis."). See generally POSNER, ECONOMI ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, at
429-41; Posner, Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, supra note 8.
173. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 4-5.
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Within this framework Professor Posner has analyzed almost
every aspect of legal doctrine. 17 4 More recently, he has expanded
his views to incorporate diverse aspects of social policy, including
concepts of distributive justice, equality, constitutionalism, and the
gamut of political and economic rights.17 15 Needless to say, civil liti-
gation has not escaped Professor Posner's scrutiny. For Professor
Posner, "the goal of a procedural system, viewed economically, is
to minimize the sum of two types of cost":17 6 the cost of an errone-
ous judicial decision and the direct costs of the procedural sys-
tem.1 77 Hence, the aim of procedure is to promote economic effi-
ciency, and Posner's formulation "enables systematic analysis of
procedural issues characteristically debated in visceral rather than
analytical terms. 17' Like Bentham and Learned Hand before him,
Judge Posner despairs at vague conceptualizations such as "fair-
ness." His economic approach permits legal questions "to be bro-
ken down into objectively analyzable, although not simple inquir-
ies. 17 9 In Judge Posner's rational legal universe, therefore, the
costs of error in civil litigation would be minimized through eco-
nomic modelling-that is, a twentieth century Benthamization of
the law.
IV. RESISTING THE BENTHAMIZATION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. The Camel's Head in the Tent: Crossing The Great Divide
to Nonmarket Applications
Professor Posner has a highly coherent view of the law, based
on his construct of positive economic analysis. He repeatedly has
praised the rational decisionmaking element of economic analysis
174. Posner's ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, discusses legal application to
market-related economic subjects, for example, antitrust, public utility and common carrier
regulation, corporations and financial markets, and taxation. The book also roams afield to
cover other nonmarket legal subjects including property, contracts, torts, family law, crimi-
nal law, distributive justice, civil and criminal procedure, administrative law, and constitu-
tional law.
175. See generally POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 7 (applying economic
analysis to nonmarket contexts such a retribution, punishment, pollution, privacy, defama-
tion, discrimination and reverse discrimination); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra
note 6.
176. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, at 429. Much of this analysis
is developed more fully in Posner, Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, supra
note 8.
177. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, at 429-33.




and argues that as long as "the economist can measure costs and
that costs are relevant to policy, economics has an important role
to play in debates over legal reform."180 Additionally, Professor
Posner has been at the forefront of broadening the interests of law-
and-economics scholarship. Scarcely a legal problem has been un-
touched by Professor Posner's analysis, with policy implications for
each issue. As judge, Posner predictably resurrected Judge
Learned Hand's negligence formula and made it famous. What was
not predictable, however, was that civil procedure would be Judge
Posner's next target for Benthamizing the law.
In retrospect, we can see that procedural motions do provide
the most likely arena for the imposition of Judge Posner's rational-
ization of the law. In a sense, Professor Posner realizes that proce-
dure precedes substance and that social good is achievable by
avoiding litigation, if possible. In Professor Posner's terms,
"[j]udicial error is therefore a source of social costs and the reduc-
tion of error is a goal of the procedural system."1 " "[L]egal proce-
dure is conceived to be the minimization of the sum of two types of
costs": error costs and direct costs.1 82 This formulation provides
the structure for analysis of procedural problems and avoids the
tendency of litigation issues to be drawn into "a purely visceral
sense of fairness."' 8
Professor Posner's error minimization framework permits
mathematical assessment of an array of litigation issues. For exam-
ple, he analyzes the mathematical condition for litigation as op-
posed to settlement.8 4 He also has assayed the effects of specific
procedures and rules on the probability of settlement, including
court delay, prejudgment interest, pretrial discovery, liberal plead-
ing requirements, and reimbursement of the winning party's attor-
ney's fees. 8 5 The relationship between error costs and direct costs
180. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses, supra note 36, at 287.
181. Posner, Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, supra note 8, at 401.
182. Id. at 399. See also supra note 176.
183. Id. at 401. This remark was made with reference to the analysis of whether a
defendant in an administrative action should be entitled to a trial-type hearing, but Profes-
sor Posner's criticism or fear is applicable generally to most traditional legal analysis.
184. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 6, at 434-41. As explained at
page 436 of Posner's book Economic Analysis of Law, the condition for litigation may be
formulated as:
PpJ-c + S>PdJ + C-S
which may be expressed equivalently as:
(Pp-Pd) J > 2 (C - S)
185. Id. at 441-58.
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supplies an analytical approach to jury abolition, 186 the efficacy of
res judicata applications,187 and burdens of proof and persua-
sion. 188 Other commentators, taking their cue from Professor Pos-
ner's work, have hypothesized economic rationales for the rules of
standing.18
In short, Judge Posner's preliminary injunction methodology
is readily transferable to all civil procedure. The underlying eco-
nomic rationale for the mathematical assessment of procedural
motions-error minimization-is a laudable goal throughout litiga-
tion, and preliminary injunctions have no special claim on the real-
ization of this goal. It is difficult to think of an aspect of the proce-
dural process that is not susceptible to mathematical reduction.
Jurisdiction, choice-of-law problems, pleading, Rule 12 motions,
discovery, summary judgment, and trial problems such as burdens
of production and persuasion, jury issues, and evidentiary rulings
all lend themselves nicely to mathematical conceptualization. Post-
trial procedures including res judicata and collateral estoppel also
are amenable to mathematical formulation.
Judge Posner, in American Hospital Supply, took great care
to stress that the preliminary injunction formula was not offered as
a new standard, but merely as a shorthand method of denoting
long-standing verbal criteria. This caveat is disingenuous. Profes-
sor Posner ardently desires to rationalize the law and reduce costs
in the economic sense; he eschews any judicial judgment smacking
of the "visceral." The preliminary injunction formula is not a pass-
ing novelty in procedural annals, and unless it is strongly reproved,
we can expect more procedural formulas from Judge Posner.
B. Legitimating Conclusions and Principled Decisionmaking
Professor Posner, in his varied writings on Jeremy Bentham,
duly notes the two major criticisms of Bentham's philosophy: (1)
the lack of any method to assess the felicific calculus; and (2) the
"moral monstrousness" of certain utilitarian conclusions. 190 In dis-
cussing these problems, Professor Posner astutely concludes that
the weaknesses of Bentham's analytical framework impelled results
that amounted to little more than Bentham's own idiosyncratic
186. Id. at 457-58.
187. Id. at 454-55.
188. Id. at 433-34.
189. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv.
645 (1973), cited in POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSis OF LAW, supra note 6, at 459.
190. See generally POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 52-58.
1987]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
preferences and peeves. Professor Posner's observation is remarka-
ble because of its obtusity; Posner fails to recognize that this cri-
tique applies to his methodology as well. Professor Posner's eco-
nomic framework for nonmarket legal transactions fails for the
same reasons that Bentham's felicific calculus failed; it simply is
unworkable. Moreover, this criticism of Bentham's methodology is
apt even apart from its moral content. The same is true for Profes-
sor Posner's work.
Professor Posner's economic analysis of nonmarket legal trans-
actions is assailable for reasons that even he cannot deny. The
entire thrust of Posner's critique centers on intellectual confusion
and ignorance stemming from linguistic imprecision. What dis-
turbs Professor Posner are the vague generalizations, the bromides,
and the shibboleths of current legal standards. According to Pro-
fessor Posner legal reform, therefore, is achievable through mathe-
matical calculation and the elimination of visceral concepts such as
justice or fairness. Professor Posner's proposed solution, however,
merely adds a new layer of bromides on top of the old ones. The
most charitable view of formula Posner is that he has taken a bad
system and made it worse: he found subjectivity and hid it under
obscurity; he found vague words and concealed them behind vague
symbols; he found a standard that was difficult to understand and
made it incomprehensible. Rather than simplifying and clarifying
legal concepts, Judge Posner complicates legal procedure by reduc-
ing it to an inscrutable set of letters and numbers, punctuated by
"greater than" and "less than" symbols. In Posner's brave new
legal world, only economics initiates will comprehend the law.
Professor Posner is right in one respect. He repeatedly has
pointed out that his critics do not understand economics and his
work. This statement is absolutely correct and represents the sin-
gle major defect in Professor Posner's views. If Judge Posner has
his own way, he will transform the law into an esoteric science
comprehensible to only a small, intellectual elite. The practicing
bar, not to mention the lay public, would find legal proceedings
inscrutable. The legitimacy of the law is in its ability to reach deci-
sions and articulate reasoning in an understandable fashion. It is
better to achieve an incorrect result arrived at by fair means
clearly stated, than to achieve a mathematically correct result by a
process no one, including the judge, truly understands. At least in
the former case, one will know when an incorrect decision has been
reached.
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V. CONCLUSION
Judge Posner's criticisms of Jeremy Bentham are haunting in
their applicability to himself:
Bentham never studied systematically any social or legal institution. . . con-
temporary or historical. He never tried to master the working principles of
the institutions he sought to reform. Instead he deduced optimal institutions
from the greatest-happiness principle and then tried to work out the details
of their implementation. This is a mode of social research that breeds utopi-
anism and its bitter cousin radicalism. Lacking an understanding of the real
world to which his reforms must be fitted, the utopian reformer grows in-
creasingly impatient at society's failure to implement his ideas and proposes
increasingly radical measures to force a refractory world into his imagined
mold. 91
Judge Posner's most serious problem is that he lacks an under-
standing of the real world-legal and nonlegal-into which his re-
forms must fit. Judge Posner undoubtedly will continue to pro-
pound increasingly complex formulas in order to force a refractory
legal world into his imagined economics mold.
Every now and again in history, a great man's death befits his
life. This was true of Jeremy Bentham who, upon his death, left
his body to science.192 We would do well to remember that the
death of Jeremy Bentham liberated John Stuart Mill to reflect on
the defects of the felicific calculus. 93 For those who labor in the
legal profession, this provides some pause for thought. Perhaps, in
the end, we all are either Benthamites or Millians.
A final word. Fifteen years ago, in a prescient article, Professor
Tribe cautioned:
In an era when the power but not the wisdom of science is increasingly taken
for granted, there has been a rapidly growing interest in the conjunction of
mathematics and the trial process. The literature of legal praise for the prog-
eny of such a wedding has been little short of lyrical. Surely the time has
come for someone to suggest that the union would be more dangerous than
fruitful."94
Professor Tribe was right. It is time again to sound the alarm.
191. Id. at 40.
192. E. HALkVY, supra note 4, at 479.
193. See J. PLAMENATZ, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS (1958); L. STEPHEN, THE ENGLISH
UTILITARIANS (1900).
194. Tribe, supra note 152, at 1393.
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